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A New Fundamental Mission for the US Space Program
Timothy K. Roberts, Lt Col, USAF
Introduction
The first thirty seven years of American exploration and exploitation of space
has been marked by two fundamental things· the forcing function of the Cold War
and the resulting relative abundance of funding for space activities. In the public's
mind, the Cold War ended six years ago, They and their representatives in
Congress have been waiting for the Executive Branch to see this "fact" for some time
and have become increasingly impatient with a lack of "appropriate" response.
Frankly, they have been promised a peace dividend and they want it - NOW. Since
the Executive Branch has been unable to deliver it as desired, Congress has been in
the process of taking it. The immediate consequences of these actions are the
precipitous drops in space funding for DoD and NASA in the Fiscal Year 1995
budgets. A clear example has been the signal inability of the DoD and NASA to get
Congressional support - and therefore funding - for new spacelift and satellite
systems. The successive fates of the Advanced Launch System, the National
Launch System, Space lifter, and various Single-Stage-to-Orbit programs are
instructive. One reason for this failure is the lack of a generally accepted reason for
being in space and therefore needing more cost-effective systems.
As far as can be seen, the public no longer accepts the old, Cold War answers
for being in space. A fundamental truth that we are being faced with is that the
American people, in the guide of their representatives in Congress, demand a clear
rationale for spending public monies. We're finding out that pure science and Cold
War national security requirements as arguments for space spending are failing in
the face of National health care or environmental clean-up, for example. To at least
maintain our share of the Federal budget, and, incidentally, continue to perform
those space missions we feel are essential, we are going to have to provide an
obvious, unarguable reason to spend $14 billion a year in space. What is necessary,
then, is a new reason for America to be in space. As the Air Force Association's
Advisory Group on Military Roles and Missions states in their 1994 report, "There
is little to be gained by arguing the need for increased space budgets. Rather, we
must look toward achieving improved efficiency by eliminating areas of
duplication and redundancy." {1:51)
Proposed New Mission Areas
Six new national space mission areas are proposed that truly meet public
perceptions of public need. These new mission areas meet emerging public des ires
for responsible stewardship of the planet and for supporting the public good.
Frankly, they attempt to answer the layman's question, "Why are we spending
billions in space when people are starving in the cities?"
WEATHERMAN: Global Monitoring. This mission area consolidates NASA's
Mission to Planet Earth and the DoD and national remote sensing missions. It
recognizes thal the technologies, platforms, and data produced are similar (il not
identical, in some cases). Some mission subsets are:
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Global Environmental Monitoring. This is a public utility and includes:

Identification of global climatological trends
Pinpointing high-risk environmental activities
Establishment of a global environmental database.
Global Weather. This mission subset collects and disseminates global weather
and other surface data to a wide variety of users. Users include military
services, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency, and private
and commercial users. This mission subset is also a public utility in the spirit
of the National Weath er Service. It recognizes the convergence of the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program and the Geostationary Orbit Environmental
Satellite into the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Sensing Satell ite
(NPOESS). Thanks to DoD and NOAA efforts, this mission s ubset is
effectively already in operation. An interesting side note is that NPOESS
already addresses the distinction between military and civil data collection
and dissemination on the same satellite bus and over the same satellite control
network.
Military Remote Sensing. This mission subset consolidates all military and
national remote sensing and surveillance missions. Users of this data are
exclusively military forces and other Government agencies. Establishment of
this mission subset allows "compartmentalization" of sensitive remote sensirfg
capabilities and data.

SHIELD: Ballistic Missile Defense. This mission area con solidates Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Ballistic Missile Defense Organization programs into one operational
mission area. It addresses the pressing need to be able to identify, track, warn, and
possibly defend against h ostile ballistic missiles launched against the US. it forces.
and its allies. It is presented as a separate mission area in recognition of the high
political sensitivity of ballistic missile defense. ·Exclusion of SHIELD won't cripple
other US space efforts. Mission subsets of SHIELD are:
• Warning of ballistic missile launch from anywhere in the world
Identification of the source and threat level to the US, its forces, and all ies
Continuous tracking and impact prediction
Negation of in-flight ballistic missiles
SENTRY: Space Survei llance and Protection. This mission area performs space
surveillance, tracking, and negation of space threats to the US. These threats are
both man-made and natural. However, this mission is separate from SHIELD
because SENTRY functions can be performed with or w ithout ballistic missile
. defense resources. In essence, SENTRY is DoD's space control mission with
planetary defense added. Mission subsets include:
Space Surveillance. This mission subset uses the DoD Space Surveillance
Network and NASA's Deep Space Network to detect, identify, and track
objects in space. The combined network virtually exists now but needs
improved sensors and command and con trol to make ii tru ly effective.
Objects of interest include natural objects such as Earth-grazing asteroids.
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comets, and meteorites and man-made objects such as active and derelict
satellites and debris.
Protection. This mission subset provides for protection of US space assets
from natural and man-made threat objects through a variety of means.
Negation. This mission subset negates space threat objects through a variety
of means. Negation can be as mundane as military action against an enemy
satellite in support of US combat operations. It can also be as exotic as
deflecting an asteroid, comet, or m eteorite from striking the Earth.
CENTURION: Military Support. This mission area captures the traditional direct
support to US combat operations. This is a critically important mission area, as
evidenced by statements made by several senior Department of Defense officials.
Gen Merrill A. McPeak, recent Air Force Chief of Staff, was quoted as saying 'Tm
convinced that tomorrow we will judge a nation's power status by it's relative
position in space." (2:2) There are many examples of CENTURION. One is the use
of national intelligence capabilities to support combat operations. TALON SWORD
and RADIANT OAK, two experiments in combining space capabilities to support
air attacks on targets beyond the horizon. (3:28-29). USSPACECOM Space Support
Teams are an integral part of providing space support to military operations and
will be a highly visible part of CENTURION.
FIREMAN: Civil Emergency Support. This mission area is the civil equivalent of
military support. It focuses the entire suite of national space assets on high-priority
civil needs, primarily in support of disaster response. This mission area is the best
example of harnessing US space systems to the service of the well-being and
security of American citizens. A very visible portion of FIREMAN would be Fast
Response Space Support Teams (FRSST) providing communicat ions, weather. and
imagery products to disaster response teams. Current DoD programs that could
sup·port FIREMAN include the Defense Communications Satellite System. the
National Polar Orbiting Environmental Sensing Satellite, the Global Positioning
System, the Defense Support Program (for forest fire or pipeline fire detection), and
national systems. FIREMAN and the associated FRSST teams would be most
visible to the American public and could garner a lot of good will through use of
existing DoD, national, and civil space assets to help Americans in trouble.
COVERED WAGON: Space Exploration and Exploitation. This mission area
continues the exploratory and scientific work the US has done for the past thirly
seven years as well as including appropriate Government support for private sector
exploitation of space and space resources. A key part of making COVERED
WAGON work is developing a long-range approach to Government-funded space
research. While the shape and direction of such a plan is beyond the scope of this
paper, a key piece must be cost-efficiency and dual use of existing and planned
space programs. A fundamen ta l problem American space scientists now face is
that". . . Congress will not fund parallel programs (so] federal agencies (must look]
seriously at consolidation and dual use.. of space assets (2:28). There are two
·mission subsets:
Space Exploration. This mission subset continues the grand tradition of
American space exploration and space science. NASA's current emphasis on
"smaller, faster, and cheaper" m issions to achieve specific scientific objectives
is appropriate for the current budget regime. However, America must never
give up lhe vision of extending the human presence into space. A deliberately
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planned and executed space science program is perhaps the best way to
guarantee achieving this glorious goal.
Space Exploitation. This mission subset contains all the support the US
Government provides to private and commercial entities seeking to derive
profit from space and space services. This can range from flying appropriate
experiments aboard Government vehicles to being an "anchor tenant" to
emerging space industries. There is a very important dynamic in this mission
subset. On one hand, commercial space exploitation is not a Government
function. The Government should not put itself in the position of
guaranteeing either a market or critical pieces of services and products for
private profit. On the other hand, the last great expansion in America
occurred in large part because of Government support. The American West
was opened because Federal support of railroads made service for profit
feasible. This is a fine line and will be one of the greatest policy decisions of
the twenty-first century.
Implications and Consequences
These new fundamental missions for the US space program have several
significant implications and consequences that must be illuminated. Such a
far-reaching restructure clearly impacts - and in some cases may well eliminate missions that the US space community is currently performing.
Space Science. The COVERED WAGON mission area deliberately doesn't speak to
large science programs. This is deliberate. Today's national mood seems to be
rejecting large science programs regardless of what they do. Large science programs
are seen as relics of the Cold War and the pervasive competition between the US
and the USSR. An excellent example is the fate of the Super-Conducting Super
Collider. Once supported as critical to unlocking key questions about the
subatomic structure of matter, it is now considered unaffordable and has been
summarily canceled. Space Station is facing the same pressures and may suffer the
same fate. It must be remembered that Americans don't appear to be willing to
fund large space science projects merely because they're performed in space.
Commercial Space. Government support of private and commercial space
industries is a very thorny issue. Recent h istory abounds with examples of
industries that eventually failed due to excessive Government support, the railroads
being one example. However, those same railroads ushered in an era of prosperity
based on Government support in opening the American West in the form of land for
rights-of-way and in "anchor tenancy". Space is certainly in the same position·
much promise but a tenuous business foundation without significant support from
the Government. As noted above, choosing the correct approach to nurturing space
industries of many types will be one of the crucial policy decisions made in the
early twenty-first century. The "correct approach" is defined as the one which
empowers American industry to open space as it once opened the West and create
an entirely new set of opportunities for a new breed of American pioneers.
Unfortunately, the "correct approach" can only be identified in retrospect.
Focus. This entire proposal is about focusing the American space program. The
withering of support for space is a direct consequence of a lack of consensus about
what space does for Americans. This proposal addresses the issue by focusing our
space efforts on our core business in space - things that either directly benefit
Americans n ow or things that enhance American prestige by providing services to
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the world at large. Other efforts simply aren't funded by the Government. Focus is
applied by proposing six mission areas. The consequence is that if a project doesn 't
fit within one of the six mission areas, it won't performed by the Government.
While this may well eliminate such programs as fl ying educational payloads, it will
maintain a broad base of public support for space. This is crucial if America is to
retain its position as the premier space-faring nation in the world.
International Cooperation. The face of international cooperation will change under
this proposal. The fate of large space science programs is problematic; therefore,
continued existing international partnerships may be at risk. However, there will
be opportunities for new kinds of cooperation. SHIELD could easily include
international partners, perhaps using proposed US-Russian Early Warning Sharing
as a prototype. WEATHERMAN can clearly accept international partners- the more
so since what is being shared is data, not hardware. SENTRY could evolve into a
service provided to the world at large with appropriate contributions. The new
mission area that could reap the greatest reward in international goodwill is
FIREMAN. Extending its benefits to international partners can garner us
immensely valuable public relations.
Public Access to Military Systems and Data. FIREMAN requires that the American
public receive extensive access to systems and data that heretofore have been the
sole province of the military and national security establishment. To cite an
inflammatory example, high resolution imagery of disaster s ites t:an be invaluable
in assessing the scope of the disaster and directing aid to the hardest-hit places.
However, the current capability is highly classified and dissemination of its
products is tightly controlled - even to the military today! (1 :52) Using all available
US space assets for emergency support will require a drastic rethinking of this
approach. Similar problems will arise in allocating co mmuni cations between
military and civil emergency users. Full implementation of FIREMAN will require
that we change the way we control and operate military and national space systems.
Supporting Missions. Little has been said in this proposal about the supporting
missions that are needed to "make space happen." Ex<lmples are spacelift. satellite
control. and range operations. These are missions that trnditionally fare poorly
over time when attempting to modernize. However, expanded public support for
the six core missions proposed will inevitably garner greatly increased support for
these supporting missions. As with other aspects of this proposal. there are
benefits and disadvantages. One clear disadvantage is that as the Government
space program becomes more broadly based. individual users lose a degree of
influence over aspects of it. For example, the Air Force has long wanted a
responsive spacelift vehicle. Under this proposal, the Air Force will have lo "sell"
its requirement to a wider audience than it does now. including entities that have
little interest in military requirements. A contrasting advantage has been cited
above several times - the broadening of the support base. As the number of users
increases, the amount of support for budget and focused goals increases. making ii
easier to keep the space program overall on course. Everybody wins.
Organizational Strategies.
"Fragmented leadership is the most prominent feature of Amerkall space
activities." (1:50)
"Costs are too high and space capabilities loo important to ar.commmlate
single-service space systems." (1:53)
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As the quotes above illustrate, the US Government is currently not
organizationally structured to perform the kinds of integrated missions proposed.
We have three Government space programs that compete for resources to do their
jobs. The four space sectors· defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial - have a
difficult time cooperating simply because the organizations set up to execute their
responsibilities have differing purposes and are now self-perpetuating (1:51). There
are many potential organizational strategies that might be used to meet this
challenge, but they all need to meet certain criteria:
There should be clear policy focus on what space can do for Americans. Space
policy should be at a level that permits consideration of all national needs on an .
equal footing.
Space funding should be managed in such a way that all national needs are
considered in developing budgets and priorities.
Space operations should be conducted so that all national needs are serviced
according to their priority.
There are many studies that propose solutions to the problem. Some focus
solely on military and national security needs (4); some take a broader view,
anticipating this consolidated approach (5). Whether space activities are combined
into one agency or are coordinated among many agencies in different departments,
the criteria listed above must be met to properly bring American space assets to
bear on national needs.
Summary

Focusing on America's core business in space will make current and future
programs more relevant to Congress and the American public. Increasing relevance
will increase support and will broaden the support base to include a much wider
variety of users. Our ability to control and exploit space is a touchstone of our
national power. To remain the world's premier space-faring nation, we must regain
control of our own space program. WEATHERMAN, SHIELD, SENTRY,
CENTURION, FIREMAN, and COVERED WAGON give us that control.
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